1. Factor of fear («Beria's-Ejov's or Dzerjinsky's syndrome») became the main instrument of influencing the peoples' activity («knout» in the arms of the power holders). This «factor of fear» gives the key to understand the appearance of the GULAG system in the Soviet Russia as an objective feature of the totalitarian state. Together with «the factor of fear» the ideological factor («honey-cake») with its huge propaganda machine became another most strong instrument in the arms of the power-holders. (In the economic sphere of life of the society this factor showed itself most vividly in the socalled «socialist competition»). It was a well-known «policy of threats and bribery», but this time -in the hands of the Bolsheviks.
2. Total drafting of the population into public organizations or different campaigns arranged by the ruling party were the non-economic methods that forced the population to work in order to achieve the goals of the system.
3. The scientific and technological factor was the last control lever in the Party's hands to achieve its goals. In contrast with the European industrial countries this factor ceded in its usage in the Soviet system and was not as important as the two mentioned above.
The 70-year history of the Soviet system showed both its advantages and disadvantages. The undoubted advantage of the system was its ability to mobilize all its resources to solve one main problem, subordinate all efforts of the system in a very short period of time. And it proved very effective in the extreme conditions like Civil war or the Second World War. But such a system may effectively function only during a short historical period and shows its non-effectiveness in a peaceful time period, when it needs to solve at the same time a lot of very complicated problems, which are caused by the objective laws of the development of the society and first of all -its economy. These disadvantages led at last to the crushing point of the Soviet state.
After the unsuccessful attempt of the Soviet leadership to export the socialist revolution to Europe at the end of the Civil war, after curtailing of the NEP at the end of the 1920s, the Bolsheviks found out that they were isolated in the whole world. The Soviet leaders had to recognize that their system could survive only with good military protection. They did not abandon but delayed for a while the realization of the idea of the Global revolution.
They needed time to prepare for a new war. Basically the main goal of the Soviet system, which was proclaimed at the end of 1920s till 1939-41, was: «To be ready… (for the new war»). It was reflected in a very popular slogan of that time: «Bud' gotov k trudu i oborone!» i.e. be always ready to work for and defend the country). All main campaigns, proclaimed by the Communist Party and the Soviet government like Industrialization, Collectivization and Cultural Revolution, were subordinated to this main goal. And a «new course» of the foreign policy of the USSR, which was declared in the early 1930s, was mainly the veiled old course in arranging the preparations for a new war.
Thanks to the totalitarian system's advantages the Soviet state had achieved tremendous results during the 1930s. The industrial production grew 8,5 times during 1929-1940, while the production of primary industry, which was the base of the defense complex of the country, grew more than 10 times (Sovetsky entsiklopedicheski slovar ', 1982, 491) . After the collectivization in the agriculture the Russian Village with 70% of the total population were put under the Party control. Being under such a control the Russian Village started to deliver both food for the Red Army as well as the urban population and, according to the new passport rules -labor power for the industrial centers. In the Cultural Revolution campaign the majority of the population were taught to read and count (at least it was enough to acquire the party propaganda and master the use of up-to-date machinery). As oborone, aviatsionnomu i himicheskomu stroitelstvu -a public military organization), Red Cross, sport societies as well as state system of MPVO (Mestnaya protivovozdushnaya oborona -Local AA System) the total population of the USSR from age 14 to 27 were taught different military professions. At least they were taught to use the rifle or machine gun, or they got to know how to give first aid.
As a result, the Soviet Union had created the most powerful army in the world.
In 1938 it had 15,000 tanks, whilst 10 years before -92 tanks only (Sovetskiye Voorujenniye Sily. Istoriya stroitelstva, 1978, 189) . In 1928 the Soviet Air Forces had only 1,400 aircraft. During 1930-1938 the Soviet aircraft industry built up 24,708 planes of different types . At the same time the average annual production of the guns of all types in the USSR increased from 2,540 to 6,130 (Ibid. The Russian North as part of the new system could not withstand to avoid all those processes, though it has some specific features because of the traditional industrial infrastructure. In the process of modernization the Russian North was allotted the role of the raw materials appendage of the Soviet industry, which would provide the Industrialization with the hard currency received by the state from the sale of timber and cellulose. This hard currency was of great importance for the industrialization process as it allowed to buy the latest machinery and technological equipment from abroad. More than half of all the employees of the Archangel County were involved in timber and cellulose industry. Before the war 10 logging trusts, 56 saw mills and 5 paper mills of Archangel county produced 10% of wooden production, cellulose and paper of the total production of the Russian Federation.
Nearly 80% of the total production was produced with the equipment that was built no later than ten years before the war, i.e. with the beginning of the Industrialization campaign. The newspapers often used to refer to the Archangel Province as «valuytni tseh strany» («the hard currency workshop»). In a period of the first two 5-year plans (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) the Archangel county provided the Industrialization with more than 500 million golden rubles (Ovsyankin, 1965, 95) .
Huge territories, river and sea routes which were connected with the global Ocean, put the Russian North into a position of a significant logistic area. During the period of the first two 5-year plans the number of cargo ships of the Northern Marine Shipping and the Arctic Marine Companies doubled (Krasavtsev, 2003, 66) .
On the eve of the war 57 cargo ships of these two companies provided the transportation of 10% of the total sea cargoes of the USSR.
2 The largest Northern River Company whose HQ was also located in Archangel, transported 11% of Russia's river cargoes. 3 The carrying capacity of the single «Severnaya» (Northern) rail-road, which connected the Archangel area with the central part of the countrywas approx. 750 wagons per day. 4 The main connecting point of all transporting ways was the Archangel marine and river port. Its technical equipment allowed to transfer approx. 80,000 tons of cargo per month.
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The dozen of the mechanical engineering factories of the Archangel county, with the biggest Solombala plant (SMZ) and «Krasnaya Kuznitsa» shipyard among them, mainly served the needs of the main branches of the local industry and transport.
The Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk) Navy shipyard («plant Nr402») which was founded in 1936 was an exception among them. Before the war it started the construction of the ships for the youngest Soviet Fleet.
Hundreds of small factories of consumer goods and local industry, as well as agricultural and fishering collective farms were called upon to provide the population of the Northern area with some sorts of food and staple goods.
The special features of the industrial complex of the Russian North determined its reconstruction and functioning in the wartime period.
* * * Though the created system was quite sufficient for the war conditions the beginning of the war caused very complicated problems, which ought to be solved urgently.
The main one among them was «the staff problem» directly connected with the mobilization to the Front. More than 120,000 citizens of the Archangel county -1/3 part of the male population of the area -were mobilized to the Red army during the war; 66,000 of them were mobilized during the first three months of the war.
The German «Blitzkrieg» offensive led to the losses of a huge amount of resources as well as to breaking the traditional ties in economy and in transport.
They stopped or strictly limited the supplies of the raw materials, spare parts and fuel to the civilian enterprises. Many factories were ruined during the enemy's air raids or diversion acts. Two dozen houses, three factories were burnt down in Leaning on the factors of influencing people's activity -first of all such as «fear» and total propaganda -this system managed to mobilize all the resources in a very short period of time. The most vivid examples that illustrate this were the mobilization or evacuation campaigns. Perhaps not a single system in the world history managed in a period of one month to withdraw 1,500 plants and more than 10 million people (the population of an average European country) at the distance of some thousand miles from West to East. After one more month most of these plants started to function quite properly. At least they produced the first production for the Front's requirements.
As one of the main problems of the war was the problem of staff, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a special decision June 26, 1941 «allowed» local administrations to prolong the working time period for 3 extra hours per day (Bogoljubov, 1969, 37-38) . The simple arithmetic estimates show that this decision compensated the resignation of all workers who were mobilized at the beginning of the war. For instance, the prolonging of the shift by 3 hours extra for 19 thousand workers of all Archangel-city sawmills was equal to recruiting 7 thousand newexperienced employees.
Later on the further mobilizations were compensated mainly due to the recruiting of women, as well as teenagers and pensioners and including them into the «socialist competition».
At the same time it meant that the main load of the rare problems and intensification of labor lay on the shoulders of these categories of the population.
The drafting of labor from among the GULAG prisoners, including POWs, assisted to solve in some way the «staff problem» in the USSR as well.
The German «Blitzkrieg» led to the enormous technical losses of the Red army.
During the first three weeks of the German invasion the Soviet Army lost 6,000 aircraft, 10,000 tanks, 60,000 automobiles. By December «irretrievable losses» of the Red army amounted to 20,500 tanks and armored vehicles, 18,000 aircraft, more than 100,000 guns or mortars. Only according to the official statistics of the Defense Ministry more than 2.8 million soldiers were killed or taken prisoners (Krivosheev, 1993, 157, 367; Chadaev, 1985, 85) . The invaders captured or ruined thousands of factories, plants and farms which produced 1/3 of the gross output of the USSR including 50% of black metals, 60% of coal, 38% of grain and 84% of sugar (Chadaev, 1985, 83, 317) .
In order to arrange the defense against the invaders it was necessary to build up in fact another army as strong as the Red army of the pre-wartime period and in the shortest period of time. That meant not only mobilizing millions of soldiers into the army, but the Soviet economy had to supply them with all the necessary ammunition, food and weapons.
So, the leaders of the Soviet industry understood the slogan «Totally Everything -for the Front!» as «Everything that does not work for the Front -is inexpedient!».
That is why every plant, factory or a small workshop started to produce things which they considered to be useful for the Front's needs. That is why the aid, which was supplied from the USA and the UK, came just in time.
It speeded up the process оf industrialization and technological modernization of the Soviet economy, and helped much in solving the main war problems of the USSR.
6 See the newspaper «Pravda» 1942, the issues for February 23 and May 1.
18,763 aircraft, 11,567 tanks and armored vehicles, 548 war ships and other supplies worth more than $13.3 billion helped, first of all, to release manpower, i.e.
indirectly to solve the main problem of the war -the staff problem (Suprun, 2002, 224; Suprun, 1997, 350) . In order to produce the supplied materials they would have needed to engage no less than 8-9 million of employees for a period of one year.
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As far as the Russian North was concerned, the manpower that was used for the production of the lend-lease supplies to this area a priori freed up thousands of workers as well. The transport supplies were of great significance for the USSR as well. During the war period the Allies sent to Russia 1,860 locomotives, 11,115 railway cars, thousands of tons of the railway equipment, 435 000 trucks and jeeps (more than twice of the total amount of the cars produced in the USSR during the war period), 71 merchant vessels, more than 1,600 cranes and excavators, a lot of navigation equipment and port facilities.
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Besides that the Allies supplied a huge amount of petroleum products, the quality of which was much better than the Soviet. The petroleum supplies occupied 12% of the total lend-lease supplies to the USSR, i.e. in the total tonnage they were at the 4 th place after weapons, food and metals. Together with the above mentioned materials, the Allies sent to the Soviet Russia some technological lines and even fully equipped factories: 4 oil refineries, tire, tin-preserving, car-assembly plants, more than 1,000 mobile power stations, etc.
As for the transport system of the North this aid played a significant role as well.
As the main point of this system was the Archangel port, the majority of the transport supplies came to it first of all. Already in 1942 9 foreign cranes were 7 The approximate calculations were done based on the fact that every employee produced goods to the value of at least $5 per day. It was similar to Ru27,0 according to the official exchange rate or Ru125,0 according to the exchange rate of the «black market». In the meantime, the whole broadcasting system of the USSR was provided by two American 50-watt radio-transmitters «М-83330А» only. They were installed in 9 RGAE. F.8045 Op.3 D.488 L.3; D.1233 L.37; Edlinsky, 1963, 152-153. 10 RGAE. F.413 Op.9 D.562 L.15-23, 27-28, 30; D.548 L.189. Soviet police system (Narodny Komisariat Vnutrenyh Del -NKVD). As the majority of the Northern industrial enterprises like timber or paper mills as well as the machine-building factories which were servicing the main branch of the Northern industry were considered to function mostly for «the civilian purposes», they had received a very small part of the lend-lease supplies during the war. A dozen of lorries, tractors and cranes as well as some machine-tool benches made in USA or UK and sent according to the lend-lease act, were noticed at that time at Solombala machine building plant and Solombala craft mill, Arkhbum pulp and paper mill and some big sawmills of Archangel.
Even shipyards became an exception among the Northern industrial enterprises due to the extraordinary obstacles and pressing requests of their leaders. For instance, only after the diversion in March 1942 at the «Krasnaya Kuznitsa», which destroyed the main tool workshop of the plant, the shipyard received two dozens of the US machine benches, special tools, telephones and the 350-ton hydro press, which is in use till now. Thanks to this aid the yard was repaid in a month and continued its normal functioning. Some Allies' instruments and benches were delivered to the ship-building plant № 402 in Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk) only after the urgent letter of its director in April 1943 to the Peoples Commissar Anastas
Mikoyan, who was in charge of the lend-lease supplies in Russia (Suprun, 2000, 78-79) .
The Allies' supplies were of significant importance for the common Victory in the war. But they were of no less importance for the post-war development of the country also. Mainly due to the usage of the foreign technological methods. It is well known that the Soviet torpedo boat of project Nr201 was copied from the American «Vosper» and «Elko». 13 The high quality of the lend-lease ships allowed Soviet engineers to solve some quite complicated problems like arranging automatic management on ice-breakers and other ships.
More than 10,000 American diesels supplied to the USSR played an important role in shipbuilding and transportation. The majority of the Soviet military motorboats constructed in 1944-1945 had the American «Packard» or «Hall Scott» motors. As for the navigation facilities, which were supplied by the Allies, they were enough to provide the needs of the navigation service in the Caspian and Azov seas, for instance. One more external factor, which was of significant importance for the process of the industrialization and modernization, were reparations. Their value for Russia could be compared with lend-lease supplies -approx. $11-12 billion. But they were delivered after the war.
So, during the war period the totalitarian system centralized itself in order to solve the main problems of the war. Totally everything that was done at the beginning of the war was done for the Front's sake. Thanks to the strict centralization the system managed in a very short period of time to mobilize all the resources and stop the enemy's offensive. But the total mobilization for the Front's needs led to the disproportions in the economy in favor of the military industry. By the end of the war the country looked like a giant on feet of clay. This giant needed to lean on crutches. The first crutch the giant received from the Allies in the form of the lend-lease aid, the second one he took later on himself -in the form of reparations.
